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Abstract
This paper investigates the extent to which trade facilitation measures included in the WTO
Trade Facilitation Agreement affect tariff evasion. In a dataset covering 121 countries and
the whole set of HS6 product categories in 2012, 2015, and 2017, the paper shows that
trade facilitation measures that improve legal certainty for traders moderate tariff evasion.
Holding tariff rate constant at its mean, one standard deviation improvement in trade fa-
cilitation measures related to legal certainty reduces tariff evasion, as measured by missing
imports in trade statistics, by almost 12%. In a counterfactual with full trade liberalization,
countries with higher scores on facilitation measures related to legal certainty experience
larger reductions in tariff evasion than countries with lower scores on these measures, even
for similar initial tariff rates. We investigate potential channels and show that improving
legal certainty is effective in reducing tariff evasion due to under-reporting of import prices
and under-reporting of import quantities, as well as in countries with weakest control of
corruption.
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1 Introduction
Customs agencies worldwide control the flow of goods across borders in order to collect taxes and
apply customs regulations. Customs agencies are a key focal point for collecting revenue, since
they can regulate between 20% and 100% of an economy’s output (Michael, 2012). Consequently,
customs agencies can be quite demanding in their effort to verify each consignment’s value, for
example, by soliciting a number of documents from the trader. Costly customs procedures can
incentivize traders to engage in customs evasion. Although global estimates are scarce, Kar and
Spanjers (2014) estimate an outflow of US$ 729 billion in trade misinvoicing from developing
countries in 2012. The losses from customs evasion are especially critical for low income countries
that rely significantly on trade tariff revenue (Jean and Mitaritonna, 2010).1 Regulating customs
evasion should therefore be of paramount interest for trade policy.
Existing literature on measures to curb customs evasion has found mixed evidence of their
efficacy. For example, Yang (2008) finds that increased pre-shipping inspection (PSI) in Philip-
pines reduced evasion through the targeted method but raised evasion through an alternative
duty-avoidance method. Similarly, Javorcik and Narciso (2017) finds that WTO accession, which
mandates using exporter invoices in order to undermine arbitrary valuation of merchandise, led
to displacement of tariff evasion to an alternative method. These studies conclude that the
overall effect of such measures on customs evasion could be insignificant.
This paper contributes to the literature by documenting the effect of simplifying customs
procedures on tariff evasion. We hypothesize that easing customs procedures should reduce the
incentive for traders to misrepresent merchandise value in order to avoid high transaction costs.
Indeed, evidence suggests that simplifying customs procedures has a dampening effect on tariff
evasion. In particular, improving legal certainty of border procedures has a significant role in
reducing tariff evasion.
1Baunsgaard and Keen (2010) report that the share of trade tax revenue in total tax receipts for 2001-2006
was 2.5% for high income countries, 18.1% for middle-income countries and 22% for the low-income countries.
Kar and Spanjers (2014) estimate that about 7% to 13% of the government revenue in the five African economies
of Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda could potentially be lost due to customs misinvoicing.
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Our analysis focuses on the provisions of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA).
The TFA addresses fees and formalities related to import or export transactions, publication
and administration of trade relations, as well as to the transitory aspects of international trade
(Neufeld, 2014). The agreement aims to reduce transaction costs by expediting release of goods,
by reducing border crossing requirements, and by increasing transparency (Neufeld, 2014).2
We study the effect of eleven measures that (with the exception of one) mirror the key
provisions of the TFA, on the sensitivity of misrepresenting import value to the tariff rate faced
by importers. We follow the literature and capture the misrepresentation of import value using
the discrepancy in value of exports reported by all exporting countries to the importing country
and the value of imports reported by the importing country from all countries (Fisman and
Wei, 2004). The discrepancy is calculated at the six digit level of the Harmonized System (HS)
classification, and is referred to as missing imports. We estimate the effect of trade facilita-
tion measures on the sensitivity of missing imports to the tariff rate in each product category,
importer and year using a dataset that comprises of 121 countries and the entire set of HS6
product categories in three years, 2012, 2015 and 2017.
The empirical analysis proceeds in several steps. First, we show that there is a positive as-
sociation between tariff rate and missing imports. The point estimate suggests that 1% increase
in tariff rate increases missing imports by 0.3%. This result, obtained in a large set of countries
and products, highlights that tariff evasion is a global phenomena.
We next examine if trade facilitation measures weaken the positive relationship between
tariff rate and missing imports. Figure 1 presents motivating evidence in favour of the hypoth-
esis that improving trade facilitation performance weakens the relationship between tariff rate
and missing imports. It plots missing imports (vertical axis) on the HS6 product tariff rate
(horizontal axis). The dashed line represents products in countries that are above the sample
2The Trade Facilitation Agreement differs from earlier multilateral agreements since it eschews a one-size-
fits-all model and encourages individual members to adopt policies that are most effective in reducing trade
costs.
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median of trade facilitation performance; the solid line represents products in countries which
are below this sample median. In countries with low trade facilitation performance we find a
positive and statistically significant effect of tariff rate on missing imports. Conversely, in coun-
tries with high trade facilitation performance the slope of the regression line is statistically not
different from zero.
<< Figure 1 about here >>
The role of trade facilitation performance in weakening the relationship between tariff rate
and missing imports is also substantiated in our regression analysis, where we control for unob-
served country and product specific characteristics that can vary over time, along with controlling
for unobserved product specific characteristics that are specific to a country. The point estimate
suggests that holding tariff rate constant at the sample mean, one standard deviation improve-
ment in trade facilitation performance reduces missing imports by 6.04%. We then unpack
the effectiveness of different trade facilitation measures, and find that improving legal certainty
significantly weakens the positive effect of tariff rate on missing imports. The point estimate
suggests that holding tariff rate constant at mean, one standard deviation improvement in legal
certainty reduces missing imports by almost 12%.
We conduct a series of robustness checks to verify our baseline findings that improving trade
facilitation performance is effective in reducing tariff evasion, and this relationship is driven
by the measure of legal certainty. In particular, we account for the possibility that missing
imports in an HS6 product category could affect the country-level trade facilitation policy. We
address the potential reverse causality by dropping the most important sectors according to
their import share in each country. We argue that missing imports in these sectors are most
likely to influence trade facilitation policy, and excluding these sectors should minimize the
plausible reverse causality. Results show that excluding these sectors have no effect on our
baseline findings. We conclude that reverse causality is unlikely to be a factor in our empirical
3
estimation.
We further examine which potential channels of tariff evasion are sensitive to improving legal
certainty of border procedures. Existing literature identifies three main channels of tariff evasion:
mis-classification of the product as a lower tax variety (Fisman and Wei, 2004); under-reporting
of import prices (Javorcik and Narciso, 2008, 2017); and under-declaration of import quantities
(Rotunno and Vézina, 2012). We find that improving legal certainty is effective in dampening
tariff evasion that occurs through under-reporting of import prices or through under-declaration
of import quantities.
Finally, we consider if the relationship between improving legal certainty and tariff evasion
is mediated by other country-level characteristics. In particular we examine if the relationship
between legal certainty and tariff evasion is sensitive to country-level control of corruption. We
hypothesize that importers in countries with weak control of corruption may find it easier to
offer customs officials side payments and avoid detection. Improving legal certainty of border
procedures can reduce the discretionary power of customs officials to apply rules arbitrarily.
Hence legal certainty can have an additional dampening effect on tariff evasion through harmo-
nizing rules in countries with weak control of corruption. Results are in line with our conjecture
and confirm that improving legal certainty has an additional effect on dampening tariff evasion
in such countries.
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. Our main contribution is to the
literature on measures to reduce tariff evasion. This literature mainly examines the effectiveness
of pre-shipment inspections (PSI), that are carried out by private surveillance companies, and
were introduced in some low income countries as a precursor to customs reforms (Anson, Cadot,
and Olarreaga, 2006, Ferreira, Engelschalk, and Mayville, 2007, Yang, 2008, Sequeira, 2016).
The literature finds mixed evidence on their efficacy, mostly due to the creation of perverse
incentives for importers and customs officers, and due to poor coordination between PSI vendors
and customs administration. Recently, Javorcik and Narciso (2017) look at the mandatory use
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of export invoices to undermine arbitrary merchandise valuation, following a country’s accession
to WTO, and conclude that the overall effect on tariff evasion is insignificant. Our study in
contrast shows that simplifying customs procedures, and in particular improving legal certainty
of border procedures, has a robust effect on dampening tariff evasion.
A second contribution is to the empirical literature on the impact of the Trade Facilitation
Agreement (Möısé and Sorescu, 2013, Hillberry and Zhang, 2018, Fontagné, Orefice, and Pier-
martini, 2020). The literature finds a significant variation in the effectiveness of different trade
facilitation measures in reducing trade costs. The effectiveness of trade facilitation measures can
vary across countries due to the level of development (Möısé and Sorescu, 2013) or competition
within sectors (Fontagné, Orefice, and Piermartini, 2020). In line with the literature, we also
observe a significant variation in the effectiveness of trade facilitation measures in reducing tariff
evasion.
We finally contribute to the literature on tariff evasion. Existing studies either identify
tariff evasion among only a few countries (Fisman and Wei, 2004, Javorcik and Narciso, 2008,
Möısé and Sorescu, 2013, Rotunno and Vézina, 2012), or their data structure does not account
for variation over time (Jean and Mitaritonna, 2010) or differences between product categories
(Kellenberg and Levinson, 2019). Our work, in contrast, finds evidence for tariff evasion in a
dataset that covers 121 countries and all HS6 product categories for three years in the period
from 2012 and 2017. We therefore complement the literature and confirm that tariff evasion is
a ubiquitous phenomena.3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present a conceptual framework
to guide our empirical analysis. We introduce the empirical strategy and describe the data in
Section 3. Section 4 presents the main findings. Section 5 concludes.
3Recent work by Bussy (2020) also uses a country-product panel dataset and ascertains the pervasive nature
of tariff evasion.
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2 Conceptual framework
Consider a representative firm that imports a fixed amount into a country. The firm can evade a
fraction of taxable amount by under-reporting the true value of the consignment. The incentive
to evade taxes should therefore increase with the tariff rate.4 The customs agency can respond to
greater likelihood of evasion at a higher tariff rate by imposing a higher threshold for verification.
For example, the customs agency can systematically seek more documents or physically inspect
the consignment, in order to verify the consignment value for goods that are charged a high
tariff rate. In other words, the cost of customs verification for a firm can also increase with the
tariff rate. Therefore, a representative firm may have an additional incentive to engage in tariff
evasion in order to avoid the high procedural costs. Trade facilitation measures, by simplifying
customs procedures, should reduce a firm’s incentive to engage in tariff evasion.
Proposition 1 Improving trade facilitation measures should weaken the positive effect of tariffs
on customs evasion.
The relationship between trade facilitation and tariff evasion can be mediated by other
factors. Customs agencies may lack the capacity to systematically apply verification procedures.
A firm’s cost of evasion should increase with the quality of imperfect customs enforcement
(Mishra, Subramanian, and Topalova, 2008). When the quality of enforcement is low, the
firm can avoid detection by offering customs officials side payments (Ferreira, Engelschalk, and
Mayville, 2007). Trade facilitation measures, by harmonizing customs procedures, weaken the
discretionary power of customs officials to arbitrarily apply rules. Therefore, trade facilitation
measures can have a greater impact in curbing tariff evasion in countries with weak control of
corruption.
4The prediction is in line with models of tax evasion that show a positive relationship between tax rate and
tax evasion (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). Fisman and Wei (2004), in a seminal paper, find evidence of tariff
evasion in trade between Hong Kong and China.
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Proposition 2 Improving trade facilitation measures should further weaken the effect of tariffs
on customs evasion in countries with weak control of corruption.
3 Empirical strategy
We first estimate the reduced form effect of tariff on customs evasion using the following speci-
fication:
miikt = β1τikt +FEit +FEkt +FEik + εikt, (3.1)
where mi ikt (missing imports) measures evasion at the importer-HS6 product-year (ikt) level.
Following Fisman and Wei (2004), we calculate dependent variable as the difference in log value
of exports reported by all exporting countries to importing country i in sector k at time t (Xikt)
and the log value of imports reported by country i from all countries (Mikt):
miikt ≡ ln (1 +Xikt) − ln (1 +Mikt) . (3.2)
In equation (3.1), τikt represents the tariff rate in HS6 product category within importer i
in year t. Importer-year fixed effects FEit account for unobserved country-level characteristics,
such as corruption level or trade policy, that could change over time. Product-year fixed effects
FEkt account for unobserved product level characteristics, such as homogenizing consumption
patterns, that can evolve over time (Kónya and Ohashi, 2007). Finally, importer-product fixed
effects FEik account for unobserved product level characteristics, such as the political influence
of sector k, that are specific to importing country i. β1 measures the tariff semi-elasticity of
missing imports. A priori, β1 > 0, i.e. higher tariff rate is associated with larger missing imports
in an HS6 product category.
We first estimate tariff semi-elasticity in a sample that covers all years from 2012 till 2017.
As discussed in Section 3.2, trade facilitation data is only available for the years 2012, 2015 and
2017. We therefore also estimate the tariff semi-elasticity of missing imports in the sample only
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covering years 2012, 2015 and 2017, which correspond to the years for which trade facilitation
data is available. In baseline estimations we exclude tariffs above the 99th percentile, while
we also provide a more conservative robustness check where only tariff rates above 100% are
excluded.5
To estimate the moderating effect of trade facilitation on tariff evasion, we modify equation
(3.1) as follows:
miikt = β1τikt + β2(τikt ×TFjit) +FEit +FEkt +FEik + εikt (3.3)
where β2 is the coefficient of interest. Equation (3.3) is estimated for each TF
j
it, where j =
{IA,IT,AR,AP,FC,FM,CP,GI} indexes measures that cover different aspects of trade facilitation
(see Section 3.2 and Table A-2). Further, we include a measure of average trade facilitation
performance (TFAK) and a synthetic measure of legal certainty (TFLC), also described in Section
3.2 and Table A-2. According to Proposition 1, β2 < 0, i.e., trade facilitation measures should
weaken the positive relationship between tariff rate and missing imports.
3.1 Threats to identification
Omitted variable bias We use a rich set of fixed effects in all estimations to address plausible
bias from omitted variables.
Importer-year fixed effects should control for the simultaneous impact of any time-varying
country characteristics – such as institutional quality, level of development, endowments of
productive factors, and technological advancements – on tariff levels and on evasion.
A second source of endogeneity can be from evolving global tastes that jointly affect tariff
rates and evasion in certain product categories. Including product-year fixed effects accounts
for this potential omitted variable bias.
Thirdly, lobbying activity of certain sectors may jointly determine missing imports and
5The 99th percentile tariff rate in our sample is 40%, while the maximum rate is 3000%.
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tariff. For example, sectors using a high share of imported inputs sourced from the same sector
might have a greater incentive to misreport imports and are also likely to lobby for lower tariffs.
The inclusion of importer-product fixed effects controls for any product specific characteristics
within an importer country, which should account for lobbying behavior assuming it does not
vary over time.6 Moreover, an importer may apply higher tax on HS6 products where it enjoys
low elasticity of foreign export supply (Ludema and Mayda, 2013). These sectors could observe
higher missing imports. The inclusion of importer-product fixed effects accounts for this source
of omitted variable bias.
Reverse causality The coefficient of interest (β2 in equation (3.3)) can still be biased due to
reverse causality. For example, the government could try to insulate tariff revenue by setting
tariff rates in inverse proportion to the missing imports (Fisman and Wei, 2004). While the in-
clusion of importer-product fixed effects should partially account for this possibility, evasion may
become apparent over time and tariffs may be adjusted accordingly (Bussy, 2020). MFN tariffs,
however, are determined through multilateral negotiations and it is unlikely that a country can
independently set the such tariffs in response to missing imports.
Another concern is that missing imports could potentially affect trade facilitation measures.
On balance, such a relationship is less probable, i.e. evasion within an HS6 product category is
unlikely to guide a country-level policy change. However, tariff evasion in HS6 sectors that are
most critical from tariff revenue perspective may provide incentive for an importing country to
simplify its customs procedures (i.e. to improve its trade facilitation performance). We address
the potential reverse causality from missing imports to trade facilitation in a robustness check,
where we exclude HS6 sectors that are in the top decile according to their import shares within
importer i.
6Our approach is similar to Ludema and Mayda (2013) who use importer-industry fixed effects to control for
lobbying behavior.
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Measurement error Missing imports may be estimated with a measurement error. Dis-
crepancy in the values of mirror trade statistics can arise as exports are recorded in free on
board (FOB) terms, while the imports are calculated including the cost of insurance and freight
(CIF). These differences are unlikely to be systematically correlated with tariffs and therefore
our estimator remains unbiased (Fisman and Wei, 2004). The measurement error can however
make our estimator less efficient. This concern is alleviated as the time-invariant component of
transport cost which is specific to a importer-product pair is accounted for in our specification,
which includes importer-product fixed effects. Furthermore, importer-year fixed effects should
also account for any improvement in national transport infrastructure which could be correlated
with trade liberalization (Javorcik and Narciso, 2008).
3.2 Data and descriptive statistics
We construct a dataset that covers more than 120 countries and the whole set of HS6 product
categories over the period 2012-2017 for our empirical analysis. This section describes the key
variables and their sources, and presents some descriptive statistics.
3.2.1 Data
Tables A-1 and A-2 report a description of all variables used in the analysis.
Trade data and reporting discrepancies Trade and tariff data are sourced from UN COM-
TRADE and UNCTAD TRAINS, respectively, at the HS6 product classification. To construct
the variable missing imports (which proxies discrepancy in trade statistics reported by part-
ner countries), we collect both data on importer country i’s reported value of HS6 product k’s
imports from the world, and data on the value of product k’s exports reported by all other
countries to country i. Regarding tariffs, we collect the most-favourite nation (MFN) tariffs of
importing country i on product k.
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Trade facilitation Trade facilitation data is sourced from the OECD Trade Facilitation Indi-
cators (TFIs). The TFIs are composed of a set of eleven indicators, which mirror the substantive
provisions of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA).7 Each TF indicator is composed
of several specific, precise and fact-based variables related to existing trade-related policies and
regulations and their implementation in practice. There is a total of 133 variables, coded as
0, 1, or 2, where the top score (2) corresponds to the best performance. Each indicator is the
unweighted average of the variables composing it.8 The TFI database covers 163 countries,
including economies at all income levels. The data is currently available for three waves, and
roughly reflects policies in place around the years 2012, 2015 and 2017.
Table A-2 displays the set of TFIs used for the present analysis. The indicator Infor-
mation Availability (that matches the requirements of Article I of the TFA), measures in its
sub-indicators the extent to which a country provides web-based information on import and
export procedures, whether the information is displayed in one of the official WTO languages,
whether documents and forms are directly available for download on the customs website, and
whether the country maintains an inquiry point and offers the possibility to ask questions on
customs-related issues by telephone or internet.
The indicator Involvement of the trade community, which matches Article II of the TFA,
covers the involvement of the trade community in the design of daily border-related operations.
Such interaction helps designing a more transparent and predictable business environment for
exporters (Fontagné, Orefice, and Piermartini, 2020).
The indicator Advance rulings, which matches Article III of the TFA, indicates whether the
country provides the exporter with a ruling concerning the tariff classification, the origin and the
valuation method that will apply to the good when it reaches the customs. The indicator Appeal
procedures, which matches Article IV of the TFA, is related to the existence of the right to appeal
7The list of the eleven TF indicators, together with a description, is available in Table 1 of OECD (n.d.).
8See Annex table in OECD (n.d.) for the full list of variables and correspondence with the respective TF
indicator.
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to an administrative decision from customs. Since Advance rulings and Appeal procedures are,
respectively, ex-ante and ex -post measures of legal certainty of border procedures, we also
consider their (simple) average as a synthetic measure of Legal certainty (TFLC).
The indicator Fees and charges, matching Article VI of the TFA, refers to the disciplines
on fees and charges other than import and export duties and other than taxes, and on the
penalties for a breach of customs laws, regulations, or procedural requirements. Article VI of
the TFA mandates that fees and charges should be transparent, and penalties commensurate to
the breach and procedurally fair.
The indicator Formalities, which matches articles VII and X of the TFA, is constructed,
as in Fontagné, Orefice, and Piermartini (2020), as the simple average of three indicators: i)
Formalities (documents), ii) Formalities (automation), and iii) Formalities (procedures). The
first captures the extent to which the complexity of documents is simplified by relying on inter-
national standards, using copies, and reducing the number of documents. The second captures
the implementation of automated procedures, electronic interchange of documents (EDI), and
the application of risk management procedures. The third captures the development of a single
window, and the existence of procedures to apply expedited customs clearance for traders.
The indicator Co-operation, which matches Article VIII of the TFA, is the simple average
of tow indicators: i) Internal co-operation, and ii) External co-operation. The former is about
co-operation between authorities and agencies responsible for border controls and procedures
within the country, while the latter is about co-operation between such authorities and agencies
across countries.
Finally, the indicator Governance and impartiality, which does not match any article of the
TFA, is about transparency of customs structures and functions, as well as accountability and
ethics policy.
We also compute the average TFI, TFAK, as the simple average of all TF indicators.
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Other variables We collect data on other variables to test the underlying mechanisms and
to serve as additional controls. We include country-level variables such as GDP per capita (in
current US$), which is sourced from the October 2018 edition of IMF’s World Economic Outlook
and control of corruption, which is sourced from the World Governance Indicators (WGI).9 In
addition, we collect data on two country-level variables that proxy overall customs efficiency.
These variables include Days to import, which is sourced from World Bank’s Doing Business
indicators, and an index of customs performance from World Bank’s Logistics Performance
Index. At the product level we include a differentiated good dummy, which equals one if the
HS6 product is differentiated, i.e. the product is neither traded on organized exchange nor does
it have a reference price according to the Rauch (1999)’s (conservative) classification.10
3.2.2 Descriptive statistics
Table A-3 provides summary statistics for all variables that are used in the empirical analysis.
Mean missing imports (in log) value is -0.04. The value is close to zero, which suggests that on
average, mirror trade statistics reported by partner countries are comparable. The negative sign
suggests that reported exports are on average smaller than reported imports.11 This is expected
since imports are calculated including the cost of insurance and freight (CIF). However, the
upper tail of the missing imports’ distribution consists of positive values. In fact, a quarter of all
missing imports observations are positive, which suggests that imports could be systematically
undervalued to avoid tariff charges. A graphical representation of missing imports, averaged
across all products and the three years of the sample (2012, 2015, and 2017) for each country is
provided in Figure A-1.
The mean (median) MFN tariff rate in our sample is equal to 6.71% (5%). As argued above,
9The control of corruption index is ranked on a scale of -2.5 to 2.5, with higher scores being associated with
a stronger control of corruption.
10The data are at 4-digit level of aggregation of the SITC Rev. 2 classification. Standard crosswalks, available
at http://wits.worldbank.org/product_concordance.html, are used to concord them to the HS 2007 classifi-
cation.
11Missing imports are calculated as the difference between exports reported by all partner countries and the
imports reported by the importing country (see equation (3.2)). A negative sign on missing imports implies that
reported exports are less than reported imports.
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only tariffs below the 99th percentile of the distribution are considered, therefore the maximum
MFN tariff is 40%. While we discard prohibitive tariff rates (in some cases equal to 3000%), we
provide a more conservative robustness check where only tariff rates above 100% are excluded.
4 Results
4.1 Trade facilitation performance and tariff evasion
Baseline results Table 1 presents the estimated effect of tariff rates on customs evasion. Each
regression includes the most restrictive set of fixed effects: importer-year, importer-product and
product-time. As expected, missing imports are increasing in MFN tariffs. The effect in column
(1) is statistically significant at 1% level. The point estimate in column (1) suggests a tariff semi-
elasticity of 0.3 for the period from 2012 until 2017. In other words, 1% increase in MFN tariff
raises missing imports by 0.3%. While smaller in magnitude compared to the semi-elasticity
reported by Fisman and Wei (2004), who only study the trade pattern between Hong Kong and
China, this point estimate is similar to studies that use larger country samples (Javorcik and
Narciso, 2008, Jean and Mitaritonna, 2010).12 In columns (2) and (3) the tariff semi-elasticity
is slightly smaller (0.2%) when we restrict the sample to years for which trade facilitation data
is available.13
<< Table 1 about here >>
Having established that tariff evasion is ubiquitous across different samples, we assess if
trade facilitation measures have a dampening effect on the phenomenon. In Table 2 we report the
results from the interaction model (3.3). The coefficient of the TF interaction terms in columns
12Fisman and Wei (2004) report the tariff semi-elasticity of around 3 between Hong Kong and China. Javorcik
and Narciso (2008) study the trade pattern between Germany and ten Eastern European countries, and find
the tariff evasion estimate to be around 0.3%. In a cross-sectional study of 75 countries, Jean and Mitaritonna
estimate the tariff semi-elasticity to be 0.24%. In a recent paper, Bussy (2020) uses a country-product sample
that includes 190 countries and all HS6 categories. He studies tariff evasion between 1993 and 2017 and finds a
slightly lower tariff semi-elasticity of 0.16%.
13Columns (2) and (3) of Table 1 use the same countries, but different sets of countries. The former uses all
available countries, the latter is based on the same sample as Table 2.
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(1)-(10) of Table 2 correspond to the coefficient of interest (β2) for different trade facilitation
policy measures. In column (1) the measure of average trade facilitation performance (TFAK)
interacted with MFN tariff is negative and statistically significant at 10% level. The negative sign
of the interaction term suggests that improving trade facilitation performance has a dampening
effect on tariff evasion. The point estimate implies that holding tariff rate constant at its mean,
one standard deviation improvement in trade facilitation performance reduces missing imports
by 6.04% (see panel (i) of Figure 2). This result confirms Proposition 1, i.e. improvement in
trade facilitation performance weakens the positive effect of tariffs on customs evasion.
<< Table 2 and Figure 2 about here >>
We next unpack the effectiveness of different trade facilitation policies in reducing tariff
evasion. The impact of overall TF is accounted for by information on advance rulings (TFAR)
and, to a smaller extent, appeal procedures (TFAP). These results are consistent with Hillberry
and Zhang (2018), who find that trade facilitation measures related to procedures, and to a
lesser extent advance rulings help reducing import time. As argued in Section 3.2, we construct
TFLC as a synthetic measure of legal certainty brought about by information on advance rulings
and appeal procedures. Its impact is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, as
shown in column (10) of Table 2. Holding tariff constant at its mean, one standard deviation
improvement in the measure of legal certainty reduces missing imports by 12% (see panel (ii) of
Figure 2).
The evasion-augmenting effect of trade facilitation measure related to the involvement of
the trading community (TFIT) in column (3) is somewhat puzzling. Fontagné, Orefice, and
Piermartini (2020) find that the measure related to involvement of the trading community does
not benefit small firms at destination, and could even hamper their trade margin by increasing
competition.
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Robustness checks We perform several checks on the main result related to the overall trade
facilitation performance (TFAK) and legal certainty (TFLC). First, we exclude sectors that are
in top decile of the distribution of import shares in country i. These sectors could plausibly drive
a reverse causal relationship between missing imports and trade facilitation. Results presented
in columns (1)-(2) of Table 3 show that excluding these sectors do not affect our estimate of
overall trade facilitation performance and legal certainty. These results suggest that missing
imports in HS6 sectors do not influence country-level trade facilitation measures. Next, instead
of excluding tariffs in top 99th percentile, we apply a more conservative criteria and exclude tariff
rates over 100%. This criterion excludes less than 2,500 observations from the full estimation
sample (approximately 1.4 million observations). Results presented in columns (3)-(4) of Table
3 show that measures of average trade facilitation performance and legal certainty continue to
significantly dampen tariff evasion (the point estimate on the legal certainty measure is smaller).
Columns (5)-(6) present the results after clustering standard errors at the country-level. While
the coefficient for overall trade facilitation performance becomes largely statistically insignificant,
the coefficient for legal certainty is almost significant at 10% level (p value=0.105).14 Finally,
we test whether our trade facilitation measures could be capturing other country characteristics
whose effect on missing imports may vary with the level of tariff. In columns (7)-(8) of Table 3
we include interactions between HS6 tariffs and (the log of) GDP per capita, and between HS6
tariffs and two other customs performance proxies: time to import (in days) and the efficiency of
customs and border management clearance (LPI customs index). The effect of trade facilitation
performance and legal certainty is robust to inclusion of these additional interactions.
<< Table 3 about here >>
Overall, results presented in this section highlight two main findings. First, we find that
average trade facilitation performance weakens the positive relationship between missing imports
14Further, the coefficient for advanced rulings remains statistically significant at 5% level even when standard
errors are clustered at the country-level.
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and MFN tariff. Second, this effect is driven by pre-shipment and post-shipment legal certainty
of border procedures. We devote the rest of the analysis to understanding the particularly salient
effect of legal certainty. We first perform a counterfactual exercise where we assess the effect of a
full tariff liberalization conditional on the observed levels of legal certainty of border procedures
in country i. Next, we identity which potential channels of tariff evasion are sensitive to legal
certainty of border procedures. Finally, we explore whether legal certainty’s effect on tariff
evasion varies according to country characteristics. In particular, we test Proposition 2, which
predicts that legal certainty can be especially effective in curbing tariff evasion in countries with
low control of corruption.
4.2 Quantification
We conduct an exercise similar to Beverelli, Fiorini, and Hoekman (2017), who estimate the
impact of full services trade liberalization on manufacturing productivity in a sample of 57
countries and 18 sectors. Column (1) of Table 4 reports for each country the estimated impact of
full tariff liberalization, averaged across all years and all sectors used in the baseline estimations
of column (10) of Table 2. Note that the number of countries in the table is 61, while the number
of countries in Table 2 is 121. This is because Table 4 only includes countries for which the
estimated marginal effects are significant at the 5% level. The numbers in column (1) of Table
4 should be interpreted as the estimated percentage change in missing imports (without the log
transformation). Column (2) of Table 4 compares the percentage change in missing imports in
each country with that of a reference country, Israel.15 The column reports the average across
all sectors and years of all the differences in the marginal effects between each country and the
reference country.
<< Table 4 about here >>
The effect is decomposed into two parts. The first column (column (3)) reflects heterogeneity
15We select Israel as the reference country since the effect of full tariff liberalization on its missing imports is
equivalent to the average effect of full liberalization in the sample.
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in MFN tariff rates, which implies that a different policy change is needed in each country to
attain full liberalization. In particular, column (3) reports the difference in the marginal effects
after aligning the trade facilitation attainment of each country with that of the reference country.
Intuitively, the values in column (3) answer the question, “what would be the difference in the
marginal effect on missing imports of liberalization if the trade facilitation context were the
same as in the reference country?”, and therefore captures the impact of heterogeneity in levels
of tariff liberalization. The next column (column (4)) reflects heterogeneity in legal certainty
of border procedures that prevails across countries. Column (4) is obtained by subtracting the
policy contribution from the overall difference, that is, (2) minus (3), and provides a measure of
the role of legal certainty in generating the difference in the marginal effect on missing imports.
Finally, columns (5) and (6) rank countries according to their average level of MFN tariff and
TFLC, respectively.16
Clearly, countries with low levels of legal certainty and high tariffs stand to gain most
from a tariff liberalization, both in absolute terms and in comparison to the reference country.
Compare the country with highest average MFN tariffs and the lowest score on TFLC, the Central
African Republic, with a country with similarly high MFN tariffs, but significantly higher TFLC,
Ethiopia. In absolute terms, the Central African Republic would experience a 10.46% reduction
in missing imports under a full tariff cut scenario, compared with a 4.63% reduction in Ethiopia.
Relative to the reference country (Israel), the reduction in missing imports would be 9.43% in
the Central African Republic and 3.85% in Ethiopia. 70% of the relative reduction in missing
imports in the Central African Republic (6.59 out of 9.43) is driven by legal certainty (column
(4) of Table 4), and the remaining 30 percent (2.84 out of 9.43) is driven by tariffs (column (3)).
In the case of Ethiopia, these numbers are the opposite, i.e. 70% of the relative reduction in
missing imports (2.58 out of 3.85) is driven by tariffs (column (3) of Table 4), and the remaining
16The rankings in columns (5) and (6) of Table 4 range between 1 and 121 (the latter being the number of
countries included in the benchmark estimations of Table 2). For MFN tariff (column (5)), the lower the ranking,
the lower average MFN tariff is across years and sectors. For TFLC (column (6)), the lower the ranking, the
higher is the legal certainty of border procedures.
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30% (1.16 out of 3.85) is driven by legal certainty. These large differences are due to the fact
that Ethiopia is relatively more different from the reference country (Israel) in terms of average
tariffs (see column (5) of Table 4) than in terms of average TFLC (see column (6) of Table 4)
than the Central African Republic.
4.3 Channels of tariff evasion and legal certainty
Existing literature identifies three channels through which tariff evasion can occur. First, tariff
evasion can occur through mis-classification of products i.e. an importer could report a higher
taxed product as a lower taxed variety (Fisman and Wei, 2004). Second, tariff evasion can occur
through under-reporting of unit prices (Javorcik and Narciso, 2008, 2017). Finally, tariff evasion
can occur through under-declaration of product quantities (Rotunno and Vézina, 2012).
We modify the baseline interaction model (3.3) and introduce product-level characteristics
that identify the potential channel of tariff evasion. First, we create a dummy variable that equals
one if, within each country and year, the HS6 product tariff is higher than the average tariff on
similar goods (Fisman and Wei, 2004).17 Lower average tariff rate on similar products would
increase the incentive to evade through mis-classification. A positive sign on the interaction
between the above described HS4 tariff dummy and HS6 tariff would imply evasion through
mis-classification. Finally, we interact the mis-classification proxy with our synthetic measure
of legal certainty. The triple interaction term identifies whether improving legal certainty can
reduce tariff evasion that occurs through mis-classification of products. Results presented in
Column (1) of Table 5 fail to detect any effect of improving legal certainty on reducing evasion
through mis-classification of products.
<< Table 5 about here >>
Next, we ask whether legal certainty can dampen evasion that occurs through under-
reporting of unit prices. We modify the baseline interaction model in two ways. First, we
17Similar products are defined as all other products in same HS4 heading. That is, HS6 product k is excluded
from the average.
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follow the literature on detecting evasion through under-reporting and use unit value gap as
our dependent variable (Javorcik and Narciso, 2017). We define unit value gap as the difference
in unit values of exports of HS6 product k in year t that is reported by the world and by the
importer:
uvgikt ≡ ln
⎛
⎝
1 +Xikt
1 +XQikt
⎞
⎠ − ln
⎛
⎝
1 +Mikt
1 +MQikt
⎞
⎠ , (4.1)
where XQikt (X
Q
ikt) is the value (quantity) of exports reported by all exporting countries to
importing country i in sector k at time t, and Mikt (M
Q
ikt) is the value (quantity) of imports
reported by country i from all countries in sector k at time t. Second, we add a dummy variable
that equals one if the HS6 product is differentiated according to the conservative version of
Rauch’s (1999) classification. Differentiated products are those products whose price may range
widely because of product quality, and therefore it may be difficult to detect under-pricing
(Javorcik and Narciso, 2017). A positive sign on the interaction between the Differentiated
dummy and tariff rate would imply that evasion happens through under-reporting of unit prices.
Further, we interact this proxy of evasion through under-reporting with our synthetic measure
of legal certainty to assess whether it can potentially dampen evasion through under-pricing.
Results presented in column (2) of Table 5 suggest that improving legal certainty significantly
reduces evasion that occurs through under-reporting of unit prices.
Lastly, we test whether legal certainty could reduce evasion through under-declaration of
product quantities. Once more we modify the baseline interaction model model in two ways.
Following Javorcik and Narciso (2017), we calculate the dependent variable as the log ratio of
the quantity of exports relative to the quantity of imports:
miQikt ≡ ln (1 +XQikt) − ln (1 +MQikt) . (4.2)
Next, we add a dummy variable that equals one if the HS6 product is not measured in kilos (Non-
kilo dummy). The idea is that it is easier to weigh a container than count number of packaged
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units (Rotunno and Vézina, 2012). Hence HS6 products that are reported in kilograms would be
more difficult to evade through under-declaration of quantity. A positive sign on the interaction
between the Non-kilo dummy and tariff rate would imply that evasion in HS6 category happens
through under-declaration of quantity. Finally, we interact the proxy for evasion through under-
declaration with our synthetic measure of legal certainty to identity whether improving legal
certainty reduces evasion through under-declaration of quantities. Results presented in Column
(3) of Table 5 suggest that improving legal certainty significantly reduces evasion that occurs
through under-declaration of product quantities.
4.4 Control of corruption and legal certainty
So far we have assessed the overall dampening effect of legal certainty on tariff evasion, which
is plausibly due to lowering the cost of customs procedures (Proposition 1). However, the
relationship between legal certainty and tariff evasion can be mediated by country-level control
of corruption. This is because importers in countries with low control of corruption can avoid
detection of tariff evasion by offering side payments to customs officials. Improving legal certainty
of border procedures can reduce the discretionary power of officials to apply rules arbitrarily.
Hence legal certainty should have an additional dampening effect on tariff evasion through
harmonizing rules in countries with low control of corruption (Proposition 2).
We modify the baseline interaction model (3.3) and include a proxy for country-level control
of corruption, a dummy that equals one when the control of corruption (CC) is below a given
threshold, Low CC dummy.18 Next, we interact the Low CC dummy with Tariff and with
TFLC. A negative sign on the triple interaction term would imply that improving legal certainty
has an additional dampening effect on tariff evasion in countries with low control of corruption.
Results presented in Table 6 suggest that improving legal certainty has an additional dampening
effect on tariff evasion in country with lowest control of corruption: the triple interaction is only
18We define three different Low CC dummies. The first is based on the 10th percentile of the control of
corruption index as threshold. The second is based on the 25th percentile of the control of corruption index as
threshold. The third is based on the 50th percentile of the control of corruption index as threshold.
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significant when the 10th percentile of the control of corruption index is used as threshold to
construct the Low CC dummy. This dampening effect of improving legal certainty in countries
with very low levels of control of corruption is likely to occur through reducing the discretionary
power of customs officials.
<< Table 6 about here >>
5 Conclusions
This paper has shown that improvement in customs administration has an attenuating effect on
tariff evasion, which has proven to be one of the most resilient form of trade costs. Using a dataset
covering more than 120 countries and nearly 5000 product categories for the years 2012, 2015, and
2017, we have shown that improving legal certainty of border procedures weakens the positive
effect of tariffs on missing imports. Improving legal certainty is especially effective in curbing
tariff evasion that occurs through under-reporting of unit prices and through under under-
declaration of product quantities. Finally, we have also shown that improving legal certainty is
likely to yield greater gains in countries with low control of corruption, through a reduction in
the discretionary power of customs officials.
Our results suggest that policy makers can introduce trade facilitation measures in a piece-
meal fashion if the primary objective is to minimize tariff evasion in a cost-effective manner.
We corroborate the Trade Facilitation Agreement’s novel approach to eschew a one-size-fits-
all model and encourage WTO member countries to adopt policies that are most effective in
reducing trade bottlenecks.
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Figures and tables
Figure 1: Trade facilitation and tariff evasion: motivation
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Notes: Missing imports defined in equation (3.2). Indicator used: TFAK (see Table A-2).
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Table 1: Tariff rate and missing imports
(1) (2) (3)
Tariff 0.003** 0.002* 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 2,819,258 1,324,891 1,187,684
No. of countries 155 137 121
No. of HS 6 4975 4916 4863
Notes: +p<0.10, ∗p<0.05,∗∗p<0.01. Dependent variable: missing imports, defined in equation (3.2). Robust standard errors
in parentheses. Country-year, country-product (HS6) and product-year fixed effects included in all specifications. Column
(1) includes years 2012-2017. Column (2) includes years 2012, 2015, and 2017. Column (3) uses the same sample as columns
(1) and (10) of Table 2. See tables A-1 and A-2 for variables’ descriptions.
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Figure 2: Average TF and Legal Certainty: marginal effects
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Notes: Marginal effects in panel (i) are computed from the estimates in column (1) of Table 2. Marginal effects in
panel (ii) are computed from the estimates in column (10) of Table 2. 95% confidence intervals based on the Delta
method. See tables A-1 and A-2 for variables’ descriptions.
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Table 3: Average TF and legal certainty: robustness
Excluding large Excluding tariff Clustered Additional
import shares > 100% standard errors interactions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Tariff 0.005* 0.006** 0.004** 0.004** 0.005 0.006+ 0.005* 0.005**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Tariff × TFAK -0.002+ -0.002+ -0.002 -0.003*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Tariff × TFLC -0.003** -0.002** -0.003 -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Tariff × GDPpc 0.002 0.004
(0.005) (0.005)
Tariff × DBtime -0.001** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000)
Tariff × LPIcust. 0.006 0.001
(0.017) (0.017)
Observations 1,047,798 1,047,798 1,198,981 1,198,981 1,187,684 1,187,684 1,165,416 1,165,416
No. of countries 121 121 121 121 121 121 116 116
No. of HS 6 4851 4851 4864 4864 4863 4863 4863 4863
Notes: +p<0.10, ∗p<0.05,∗∗p<0.01. Dependent variable: missing imports, defined in equation (3.2). Robust standard errors
in parentheses, except in columns (5) and (6) where standard errors are clustered at the country-level. Country-year,
country-product (HS6) and product-year fixed effects included in all specifications. Years included: 2012, 2015, and 2017.
See tables A-1 and A-2 for variables’ descriptions.
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Table 4: Quantification
Country ISO3 %∆MI %∆MI − %∆MIRC Components of (2) Country rankings
(3) + (4) Tariff TFLC Tariff TFLC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Central African Republic CAF -10.46 -9.43 -2.84 -6.59 121 121
Malawi MWI -6.73 -5.61 -1.72 -3.89 110 118
Burkina Faso BFA -6.52 -5.57 -1.71 -3.86 106 117
Bangladesh BGD -6.33 -5.43 -2.02 -3.41 115 114
Benin BEN -5.51 -4.48 -1.74 -2.73 112 111
Antigua and Barbuda ATG -5.48 -4.28 -1.50 -2.78 107 112
Maldives MDV -5.38 -4.57 -1.28 -3.29 94 116
Togo TGO -5.14 -4.19 -1.74 -2.45 109 108
Solomon Islands SLB -5.01 -3.96 -0.83 -3.13 84 119
Rwanda RWA -4.87 -3.90 -1.81 -2.09 114 102
Mali MLI -4.80 -3.87 -1.69 -2.18 104 106
Belize BLZ -4.71 -3.61 -1.16 -2.45 92 113
Ethiopia ETH -4.63 -3.85 -2.68 -1.16 119 85
Zimbabwe ZWE -4.63 -3.82 -1.92 -1.89 111 100
Samoa WSM -4.47 -3.42 -1.33 -2.09 97 107
Cote d’Ivoire CIV -3.81 -2.95 -1.73 -1.22 103 93
Eswatini SWZ -3.79 -2.98 -0.76 -2.22 79 115
Tunisia TUN -3.58 -2.71 -2.02 -0.70 117 81
Zambia ZMB -3.58 -2.64 -1.83 -0.81 113 83
Uganda UGA -3.54 -2.68 -1.72 -0.96 102 87
Jamaica JAM -3.49 -2.13 -0.87 -1.26 88 101
Madagascar MDG -3.35 -2.52 -1.61 -0.91 100 86
Tanzania TZA -3.32 -2.52 -1.72 -0.80 101 84
Fiji FJI -3.30 -2.36 -1.35 -1.01 95 92
Bolivia BOL -3.10 -2.44 -1.73 -0.71 98 82
Paraguay PRY -3.03 -2.22 -1.39 -0.84 93 89
Lesotho LSO -3.01 -2.11 -0.81 -1.30 81 104
Angola AGO -2.90 -2.24 -0.74 -1.50 70 110
Nepal NPL -2.88 -2.15 -1.69 -0.46 99 76
Uruguay URY -2.82 -2.08 -1.55 -0.53 96 79
Argentina ARG -2.73 -2.17 -2.28 0.11 116 64
Egypt EGY -2.63 -2.02 -1.25 -0.77 83 90
Ecuador ECU -2.61 -2.05 -1.58 -0.47 91 77
Namibia NAM -2.61 -1.86 -0.71 -1.16 71 105
Botswana BWA -2.41 -1.60 -0.74 -0.85 78 95
Dominican Republic DOM -2.35 -1.49 -0.71 -0.78 77 94
Panama PAN -2.29 -1.34 -0.47 -0.87 67 98
Morocco MAR -2.16 -1.42 -1.34 -0.08 90 70
Belarus BLR -2.06 -1.12 -0.62 -0.50 73 88
Lebanon LBN -1.97 -1.22 -0.37 -0.85 56 103
China CHN -1.95 -1.26 -1.23 -0.04 86 69
Indonesia IDN -1.78 -1.28 -0.98 -0.30 75 74
Sri Lanka LKA -1.66 -0.84 -0.83 0.00 80 68
Palau PLW -1.58 -0.53 0.47 -1.01 10 120
Qatar QAT -1.54 -0.77 -0.15 -0.62 23 99
El Salvador SLV -1.50 -0.63 -0.38 -0.24 63 78
Kuwait KWT -1.49 -0.73 -0.16 -0.57 28 97
United Arab Emirates ARE -1.48 -0.79 -0.23 -0.56 26 96
Mexico MEX -1.45 -0.71 -0.55 -0.16 64 71
Honduras HND -1.38 -0.51 -0.34 -0.16 60 73
Kazakhstan KAZ -1.38 -0.52 -0.63 0.11 74 59
Saudi Arabia SAU -1.35 -0.64 -0.24 -0.40 48 91
Mongolia MNG -1.29 -0.41 -0.15 -0.25 53 80
Chile CHL -1.17 -0.47 -0.51 0.04 62 65
Kyrgyz Republic KGZ -1.12 -0.41 -0.51 0.10 61 60
Oman OMN -1.09 -0.35 -0.18 -0.17 30 75
Armenia ARM -1.09 -0.38 -0.43 0.05 57 63
Guatemala GTM -1.08 -0.29 -0.36 0.07 58 62
Bahrain BHR -1.05 -0.26 -0.14 -0.12 32 72
Italy ITA -0.85 -0.14 -0.21 0.07 19 61
Israel ISR -0.70 0 0 0 13 67
Georgia GEO -0.63 0.27 0.54 -0.27 5 109
New Zealand NZL -0.46 0.23 0.22 0.01 6 66
Notes: Reference country (RC) for columns (2)-(4): Israel (indicated in bold). MI = missing imports of equation (3.2)
without the log transformation. Only countries for which the estimated marginal effects from regressions in column (10)
of Table 2 are significant at the 5% level are included in the table. Tariff and TFLC respectively defined in tables A-1 and
A-2.
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Table 5: Legal certainty: channels of tariff evasion
Misreporting Underinvoicing Underdeclaration
of quantities
(1) (2) (3)
Tariff 0.006** -0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Tariff × TFLC -0.003** 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Tariff × HS4 tariff dummy 0.000
(0.002)
Tariff × HS4 tariff dummy × TFLC -0.001
(0.001)
Tariff × Differentiated dummy 0.006*
(0.003)
Tariff × Differentiated dummy × TFLC -0.004**
(0.001)
Tariff × Non-kilo dummy 0.004
(0.004)
Tariff × Non-kilo dummy × TFLC -0.006**
(0.002)
Observations 1,186,788 922,853 1,027,091
No. of countries 121 121 121
No. of HS 6 4863 4403 4856
Notes: +p<0.10, ∗p<0.05,∗∗p<0.01. Dependent variable: missing imports in values, defined in equation (3.2) in column (1);
unit value gap, defined in equation (4.1) in column (2); missing imports in quantities, defined in equation (4.2) in column
(3). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Country-year, country-product (HS6) and product-year fixed effects included
in all specifications. Years included: 2012, 2015, and 2017. See tables A-1 and A-2 for variables’ descriptions.
32
Table 6: country-level control of corruption and legal certainty
Control of corruption (CC) percentile
10th 25th 50th
(1) (2) (3)
Tariff 0.007** 0.005** 0.007**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Tariff × TFLC -0.003** -0.002** -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Tariff × Low CC dummy 0.000 0.003+ -0.001
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Tariff × Low CC dummy ×TFLC -0.007* -0.002 -0.001
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 1,187,684 1,187,684 1,187,684
No. of countries 121 121 121
No. of HS 6 4863 4863 4863
Notes: +p<0.10, ∗p<0.05,∗∗p<0.01. Dependent variable: missing imports in values, defined in equation (3.2) in column (1).
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Country-year, country-product (HS6) and product-year fixed effects included in all
specifications. Years included: 2012, 2015, and 2017. See tables A-1 and A-2 for variables’ descriptions.
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Appendix figures and tables
Figure A-1: Missing imports, country-level averages
(.93,1.29] (1)
(.58,.93] (3)
(.22,.58] (11)
(−.14,.22] (70)
(−.5,−.14] (27)
(−.85,−.5] (6)
[−1.21,−.85] (3)
No data (110)
Notes: Countries covered: 163. See Table A-1 for the description of missing imports. Averages computed across the years
of TF data availability (2012, 2015, and 2017).
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Table A-1: Variables’ description
Variable Description Data source
Missing imports
(values)
Log difference in value of exports reported by all exporting
countries to importing country i in sector k at time t (Xikt)
and value imports reported by country i from all countries
(Mikt). See equation (3.2)
UN Comtrade
Unit value gap Log difference in the unit value of exports reported by all
exporting countries to importing country i in sector k at time t
and unit value of imports reported by i from all countries. See
equation (4.1)
– ''–
Missing imports
(quantities)
Log difference in the quantity of exports reported by all
exporting countries to importing country i in sector k at time t
and quantity of imports reported by country i from all
countries. See equation (4.2)
– ''–
Tariff Log of MFN applied tariff of importing country i in sector k UNCTAD TRAINS
TFj See Table A-2 OECD TFIs
GDPpc Log of gross domestic product per capita IMF WEO
DBtime Number of days to import World Bank DB
LPIcust. Efficiency of customs and border management clearance World Bank LPI
HS4 tariff dummy Dummy equal to one if the tariff in sector k in importer i in
year t is greater than its corresponding HS4 average (excluding
sector k’s tariff from the average)
UNCTAD TRAINS
Differentiated
dummy
Dummy equal to one if k has no reference price and k’s price is
not quoted on an organized exchange
Rauch (1999)
Non-kilo dummy Dummy equal to one if, within i, k is never reported in
kilograms between 2012 and 2017
UN Comtrade
Low CC dummy
(10th percentile)
Dummy equal to one for observations if the Control of
Corruption (CC) index is below its 10th percentile
World Bank WGI’s
Low CC dummy
(25th percentile)
Dummy equal to one for observations if the Control of
Corruption (CC) index is below its 25th percentile
– ''–
Low CC dummy
(50th percentile)
Dummy equal to one for observations if the Control of
Corruption (CC) index is below its 50th percentile
– ''–
Notes: TFj = Trade Facilitation indicator j, j = {IA, IT,AR,AP,FC,FM,CP,GI}. DB = Doing Business. LPI =
Logistics Performance Index. TFIs = Trade Facilitation Indicators. WEO = World Economic Outlook. WGI’s = World
Governance Indicators.
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Table A-2: TFI indicators used
Indicator
Variable
Description
WTO TFA
name article
(a) Information TFIA Enquiry points; publication of trade information, I
availability including on Internet
(b) Involvement of the TFIT Structures for consultations; established guidelines II
trade community for consultations; publications of drafts; existence of
(consultations) notice-and-comment frameworks
(c) Advance rulings TFAR Prior statements by the administration to requesting III
traders concerning the classification, origin, valuation
method, etc. applied to specific goods at the time of
importation; the rules and process applied to such
statements
(d) Appeal procedures TFAP The possibility and modalities to appeal administrative IV
decisions by border agencies
(e) Fees and charges TFFC Disciplines on the fees and charges imposed on imports VI
and exports; disciplines on penalties
(f, g, h) Formalities TFFM Average of (f) Formalities (documents), (g) Formalities VII, X
(automation), and (h) Formalities (procedures)
(i, j) Cooperation TFCP Average of (i) Internal cooperation, and VIII
(j) External cooperation
(k) Governance and TFGI Customs structures and functions; accountability; –
impartiality ethics policy
Averages
(a)-(k) AK Average TFAK Simple average of TFIA, TFIT, TFLC, TFFC, TFFM,
TFCP, and TFGI
(c, d) Legal certainty TFLC Simple average of TFAR and TFAP
Notes: See Table 1 in OECD (n.d.) for the description of TFI indicators (f) Formalities (documents), (g) Formalities
(automation), (h) Formalities (procedures), (i) Internal co-operation, and (j) External co-operation. TFI indicator (k)
Governance and impartiality is outside the scope of the WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA).
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Table A-3: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Median Std Dev Min Max
Missing imports (values) -0.04 -0.06 1.37 -15.26 13.79
Unit value gap 0.11 -0.01 1.26 -22.48 28.03
Missing imports (quantities) -0.14 -0.05 1.98 -28.00 23.25
Tariff 6.71 5.00 7.53 0 40
TFAK 1.39 1.44 0.30 0.28 1.93
TFIA 1.61 1.65 0.29 0 2
TFIT 1.40 1.50 0.48 0 2
TFAR 1.36 1.50 0.60 0 2
TFAP 1.49 1.50 0.39 0 2
TFFC 1.44 1.50 0.48 0 2
TFFM 1.34 1.38 0.35 0.33 2
TFCP 1.27 1.33 0.57 0 2
TFGI 1.53 1.71 0.48 0 2
TFLC 1.40 1.51 0.44 0 2
GDPpc 9.21 9.28 1.31 5.87 11.57
DBtime 18.03 15.00 12.60 4.00 73.75
LPIcust. 2.95 2.83 0.57 2.05 4.09
Variable Zeros Ones Std Dev Min Max
HS4 tariff dummy 940,793 245,995 0.41 0 1
Differentiated dummy 321,748 601,105 0.48 0 1
Non-kilo dummy 734,313 292,778 0.45 0 1
Low CC dummy (10th percentile) 1,142,106 45,578 0.19 0 1
Low CC dummy (25th percentile) 977,087 210,597 0.38 0 1
Low CC dummy (50th percentile) 662,674 525,010 0.50 0 1
Notes: See tables A-1 and A-2 for variables’ description.
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